The 1968 Formula One season fundamentally changed the relationship between a racing car and the air surrounding it. Until then, aerodynamic thinking had concentrated largely on reducing drag. In 1968, designers began exploiting airflow to create downforce, pressing the car against the track and dramatically increasing its cornering potential.
At Monaco, Lotus experimented with aerodynamic devices on the Lotus 49B. The revolution accelerated at Spa, where Ferrari and Brabham appeared with prominent wings mounted above their cars. Ferrari continued developing the concept until the angle of its wing could be adjusted by the driver, increasing downforce through corners while reducing aerodynamic resistance on the straights. Rival teams quickly recognized the potential and followed.
The importance of that development is difficult to overstate. As Game Changer observes, “Aerodynamics improved the physics and speed capability to heretofore impossible capability.” What began in 1968 would ultimately become one of the defining sciences of Formula One. Indeed, the book describes the modern Grand Prix car as a direct descendant of the aerodynamic experiments of the Lotus 49 at Monaco and Chris Amon’s Ferrari at Spa.
But there was an ominous consequence. Aerodynamic efficiency allowed cars to corner faster without corresponding improvements in circuits, barriers, driver protection or emergency response. Formula One had discovered a method of increasing performance faster than it was increasing survivability.
As Game Changer argues, “The advancements in racing car design meant higher speeds and an increase in the necessity for additional safety.” That relationship became increasingly impossible to ignore. Jackie Stewart and other drivers pushed for greater runoff areas, improved barriers, better medical facilities and the removal of dangerous trackside obstacles. Regulations would also begin restricting aerodynamic devices themselves, including the towering wings that soon demonstrated how dangerous poorly controlled aerodynamic innovation could become.
Thus, 1968 produced a remarkable paradox. Aerodynamics helped create the modern Formula One car, while the resulting increase in performance helped expose the inadequacy of Formula One’s existing safety standards. The technological revolution and the safety revolution were not separate developments. They became inseparably linked—and both can trace a decisive turning point to 1968.